The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) prohibits U.S.-related firms from making bribes abroad. We analyze the FCPA's effects in a model of competition between a U.S. and foreign firm for contracts in a host country. If the FCPA only applies to the U.S. firm, it reduces that firm's competitiveness and either increases bribery by the foreign firm or reduces overall investment. If the FCPA also applies to foreign firms, it reduces bribery, and in host countries with high corruption levels, it increases investment. Our analysis of recent cases indeed shows that the FCPA is often enforced against foreign firms, and its enforcement is typically limited to activity in host countries with high corruption levels.
"It's a horrible law and should be changed (...) It puts us at a huge disadvantage." -Donald Trump speaking on the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (CNBC, May 15, 2012) 1 
Introduction
Corruption has been shown to reduce economic growth, investment activity, and international trade (for a survey of empirical evidence, see Dreher and Herzfeld, 2005) . In an effort to reduce corruption, the U.S. government has levied billions of dollars in penalties over the last several years for violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA") of 1977, a broad U.S. law that criminalizes the payment of bribes by U.S. citizens and corporations to government officials anywhere in the world. FCPA enforcement actions have been taken against many of the world's largest and most well-known companies, including IBM, General Electric, Ralph Lauren, Pfizer, and Chevron. 2 In this paper, we address the following questions: how does the FCPA affect the competitiveness, bribery activity, and investments of U.S. firms, and how do the answers depend on whom the U.S. firms are competing against and in which countries they are competing? To answer these questions, we use a contest model of competition between a U.S. multinational firm and a competitor for a government contract in a host country. Firms can increase their chances of winning the contract through two activities, productive investment and bribery.
The relative weight that the contest official places on bribery is a proxy for the extent of corruption in the host country.
In this context, we ask: When does the FCPA disadvantage U.S. firms? Does the FCPA achieve its goal of reducing bribery? Does it have an impact on productive investments made by the U.S. firm and its competitor? The answers depend critically on whether the competing firm has U.S. ties. When the competing firm has no ties to the U.S., the FCPA only applies to the U.S.
firm.
3 In this case, the FCPA always puts the U.S. firm at a disadvantage, reducing its probability of winning the contract. The FCPA reduces bribery by the U.S. firm. However, it increases bribery by the competing firm if the U.S.
firm is the favorite to win the contest, and it reduces productive investment by both firms if the U.S. firm is not the favorite to win. It increases total bribery effort if the U.S. firm is sufficiently dominant in the productive activity and the level of corruption in the host country is sufficiently high. In sum, with enforcement limited to U.S. firms, the FCPA not only harms the competitiveness of U.S. firms, but may also fail in achieving its primary objective of reducing bribery or will have the negative externality of reducing productive investment.
On the other hand, when the competing firm has ties to the U.S. (see footnote
3), the FCPA applies to both firms. In this case, the FCPA favors the firm with the absolute disadvantage in bribery. It reduces both firms' bribery efforts. If one of the firms has the absolute advantage in both bribery and investment, then the FCPA balances the contest and increases both firms' investment efforts. If no firm has an absolute advantage in both bribery and investment, then the effect of the FCPA on investment efforts depends on the level of corruption in the host country. The FCPA increases both firms' investment efforts if the firm that has the absolute advantage in bribery is the favorite to win the contest, which is the case when the level of corruption in the host country is high. On the other hand, the FCPA reduces both firms' investment efforts if the firm with the absolute disadvantage in bribery is the favorite to win, which is the case if the corruption level in the host country is low. In sum, with symmetric enforcement limited to activity in host countries with high corruption levels, the FCPA does not a priori harm the competitiveness of U.S. firms and both reduces bribery and increases productive investment.
Broadly, the model suggests that the FCPA can reduce bribery and increase 3 In addition to applying to all U.S. companies, the FCPA applies to non-U.S. companies that have a U.S. subsidiary or do business in the U.S., issue stock in the U.S., or trade their home country's stock through American Deposit Receipts that require filing with the U.S. 
Related Literature
Our paper contributes to the economics literature on corruption. From the outset, corruption and bribery have been considered forms of rent-seeking in the economics literature (Krueger, 1974; Posner, 1975; Tullock, 1980; Baye et al., 1993; Lambsdorff, 2002) . We model bribery in an extension of the standard TulIock contest model that allows for players to engage in more than one activity, and we distinguish bribery from other activities in that it is illegal and potentially subject to fines. In our model, bribery is potentially harmful in that it can unbalance contests in favor of firms that are better at bribery and thereby reduce productive investment. Our paper also contributes more specifically to the law and economics literature on bribery. For an excellent review, see
Rose-Ackerman (2010). Polinsky and Shavell (2001) and Garoupa and Klerman (2004; 2010) analyze optimal law enforcement given the central problem that public enforcement creates incentives for bribery and thus undermines deterrence. Basu et al. (2014) find that it may be optimal to punish bribers and bribees asymmetrically to reduce collusion and preserve the incentives of agents to report bribery. They model the choices of a representative firm, and focus on the bribe choice. We model the interplay between competing firms and consider both the choices of productive investment and bribery.
To our knowledge, our paper is the first to provide a formal theoretical 
The Model
Consider two firms competing for a contract allocated by a government official in a host country. The value of the contract to each firm is normalized to one.
Firm 1 is the U.S. firm, and firm 2 is a foreign firm that may or may not have ties with the U.S. The firms can influence the outcome of the contest by engaging in productive investment and in bribery. Denote by   ∈ R + and   ∈ R + efforts of player  ∈ {1 2} in productive investment and in bribery, respectively.
Both activities increase a firm's chances of winning the contest. We assume that firm 's probability of winning (called contest success function or CSF ) has the
, where  ∈ (0 1) is the (relative) weight placed on bribery by the contest official and is a measure of the level of corruption in the host country. 5 The marginal cost of productive investment for firm  is    0. The marginal cost of bribery is increasing in fines on firms that are subject to the FCPA. We analyze two regimes, one where the FCPA applies only to the firm 1 (U.S. firm) and one where the FCPA applies to both firms. In the first regime, the marginal cost of bribery is  1 () =  1 +  for firm 1 and  2 () =  2 for firm 2. In the second regime, the marginal cost of bribery is   () =   +  for both firms since they are both subject to fines under the FCPA in this regime. Firm 's payoff in the contest is then:
Firm 1 (the U.S. firm) has an absolute advantage in the productive activity
; and a comparative advantage in the productive activity if
be the measure of firm 2's comparative advantage in bribery. We call
 firm 2's overall (relative) strength, and we call Λ = Θ (1 + Θ) −2 the balance of power in the contest. Firm 1 is stronger overall if Θ  1 and is weaker overall if Θ  1.
We first characterize the equilibrium efforts of the contest ( *
2 ) and conditions for firm  to be the favorite to win the contest ( *   12).
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Lemma 1.
for  ≥ 0 and  = 1 2. The U.S. firm's probability of winning is  *
(ii) A firm is the favorite to win the contest (  *   12) when it has an absolute advantage in both activities, or only in productive investment and the corruption level is sufficiently low (
2´ log  ()), or only in bribery and the corruption level is sufficiently high (   b ).
According to Lemma 1(i), the equilibrium efforts depend on the balance of power in the contest, Λ, which in turn depends on the overall strength of the U.S. firm, Θ. The U.S. firm's probability of winning is  *
follows that if the U.S. firm is stronger overall (Θ  1), then it is the favorite to win the contest ( * 1  12), and if it is weaker overall (Θ  1), then it is the underdog ( * 1  12). Lemma 1(ii) states, quite intuitively, that for a firm to be the favorite, it must either have an absolute advantage in both activities, or only in one activity but with sufficient weight being placed on that activity in the influence production function. Proposition 1. Suppose there is a marginal increase in the cost of bribery only for the U.S. firm under the FCPA. Then, the U.S. firm is disadvantaged in that its probability of winning the contest decreases. The U.S. firm's bribery effort (  * 1 ) decreases. When the U.S. firm is the favorite to win the contest ( Θ  1), both firms' investment efforts and the bribery effort of firm 2 (  * 1 ,  * 2 , and  * 2 ) increase, and otherwise they decrease. Total bribery effort (
, where
and otherwise, total bribery effort decreases.
When the FCPA only applies to the U.S. firm, it unambiguously reduces the U.S. firm's probability of winning the contest and the U.S. firm's bribery effort.
Its effects on the non-U.S. firm's bribery effort and on both firms' investment efforts depend on whether or not the U.S. firm is the overall favorite in the contest Thus, when the FCPA only applies to the U.S. firm, it either increases bribery by the foreign firm or reduces both firms' investment efforts. Moreover, Proposition 1 shows that it increases total bribery effort if the level of corruption in the host country is sufficiently high and the U.S. firm is sufficiently dominant in the productive activity ( 1  2 is sufficiently low).
When FCPA Applies to Both Firms
We now consider the case where firm 1 (the U.S. firm) is competing against a firm that is also subject to FCPA enforcement because it has U.S. ties. In this case, instead of costs  1 and  2 per unit of effort, firms have costs  1 +  and  2 + . FCPA enforcement then increases both firms' cost of bribery by a common amount. A common marginal increase in the cost of bribery for both firms under the FCPA favors the firm with an absolute disadvantage in bribery. It unambiguously reduces both firms' bribery efforts since it increases both firms' punishment for bribery. However, the effect on the firms' investment efforts depends on which firm is the favorite to win the contest. Intuitively, when the firm with the absolute advantage in bribery is the favorite to win the contest, then the FCPA reduces the favorite's advantage, thereby balancing the contest and increasing both firms' investment efforts. On the other hand, when the firm with the absolute advantage in bribery is not the favorite to win the contest, then the FCPA increases the favorite's advantage, thereby unbalancing the contest and reducing both firms' investment efforts. By part (ii) of Lemma 1, the firm with the absolute advantage in bribery is the favorite if it also has an absolute advantage in productive investment or if it does not have an absolute advan-tage in productive investment but the level of corruption in the host country is sufficiently high.
Thus, if the FCPA applies to both firms, then it reduces bribery efforts by both firms; and if its enforcement is targeted to activity in host countries with high levels of corruption, then it also increases productive investment by both firms, while not a priori harming the competitiveness of the U.S. firm.
Descriptive Evidence
Proposition 1 shows that if the FCPA is only applied to U.S. firms, then it harms the competitiveness of U.S. firms and either increases bribery by competing foreign firms or reduces productive investments by both U.S. and foreign firms.
In this case, Donald Trump's statement that the FCPA puts U.S. firms at a disadvantage (see the introductory quote on page 2) is found to be correct.
However, Proposition 2 shows that if the FCPA is applied to both U.S. and foreign firms and targeted to activities in host countries where corruption levels are high, then it reduces bribery and increases investment without a priori harming U.S. competitiveness. So the key empirical questions are whether the FCPA is mainly applied to U.S. firms or is applied to both U.S. and foreign firms and whether or not it is typically targeted to activity in host countries with high levels of corruption in practice. Table 1 
Analysis of Recent FCPA Cases

Example: Braskem and Odebrecht
Odebrecht is a Brazilian construction conglomerate, and Braskem is an affiliated petrochemical manufacturer. Odebrecht is involved in a wide variety of construction and industry-related projects around the world. 8 Braskem focuses on thermoplastic resins but produces many other chemical inputs. 9 only pay $2.6 billion, so the final resolution is expected to be a record-high $3.5 billion.
12
In 2015, Odebrecht had 168,000 employees and $46 billion in revenues. 13 Hoover's database lists the Fluor Corporation of Irving, Texas, and the Bechtel Group of San Francisco, California as Odebrecht's two main competitors.
14 Fluor is the largest Fortune 500 engineering and construction company, 15 with over 60,000 employees and $19 billion in revenues in 2016. 16 Bechtel is the third largest international contractor by revenue 17 , with 58,000 employees and $32.2 billion in revenues in 2015. 18 Two other Brazilian multinationals, OAS and Andrade Gutierrez, are also of note since they are the second and third largest Brazilian engineering and construction companies behind Odebrecht (Horch, 2015; Cascione, 2016) . They also helped construct venues for the Rio Olympics, which means they almost certainly competed with Odebrecht for government contracts (Eisenhammer, 2015) . All of these companies have completed projects in Brazil over the last few years. Odebrecht must have out-competed/out-bribed all of them since it controlled the majority of projects for the Rio Olympics. All of the companies also have shares or bonds that are traded in the U.S. and so are subject to the FCPA (Schoenberg and Brice, 2015).
Conclusion
We developed a model to analyze the effects of the FCPA on competitiveness, bribery, and productive investment. Our results show that if the FCPA is applied only to U.S. firms, then it harms the competitiveness of U.S. firms and either increases bribery by non-U.S. firms or reduces productive investment by both U.S. and non-U.S. firms. However, if the FCPA is applied to both U.S.
and non-U.S. firms and targets activity in host countries with high corruption levels, then it does not a priori harm the competitiveness of U.S. firms, and it reduces bribery and increases productive investment by both U.S. and non-U.S.
firms. We also find that the recent history of FCPA enforcement actions indicates that the FCPA is increasingly being applied to non-U.S. as well as U.S. multinationals through cooperation from foreign governments. Provided this trend of international cooperation in anti-bribery efforts continues, our analysis suggests that the FCPA will not weaken U.S. competitiveness and will deter bribery while stimulating investment.
In our model, we assume that the degree of corruption in the host country () is exogenous and not affected by the FCPA. With international cooperation in anti-bribery efforts, it might be possible to reduce the demand for bribes as well as its supply in the host countries-effectively changing the culture of corruption in these countries. Specifically, FCPA fines could be applied not only to international firms for engaging in bribery, but also to government officials in the host countries for accepting bribes. Investigating the optimal mix of fines on international firms and on government officials in host countries for engaging in corruption is an interesting avenue for future research. 
The cost function associated with the CD-type production function
(ii) We next derive conditions for Θ  1 and Θ  1. First, suppose
2()  1; and Θ  1 when
firm has an absolute advantage in both activities, that is,
Suppose the U.S. firm has an absolute disadvantage in both activities, that is, 1 ≤
, then   1; Θ is exponentially decreasing in , and
Proof of Proposition 1.
for  ≥ 0;  = 1 2. First, we show that 3 , and   0 and
This inequality clearly holds if the U.S. firm is the underdog (Θ  1). Since
by the Intermediate Value
Theorem there exists a unique critical level b
for the absolute disadvantage of the U.S. firm in the productive activity, such that (
It follows that
, and otherwise 
